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only provide a format for discussion of these issues but also offer some
solutions.
Before we begin, I would like to thank a few persons. First, I would like
to thank Professor Gordon, without whose help this symposium would not
have been possible, and whose encouragement has helped this journal grow
and prosper. I also would like to thank Sharon Stark for organizing this
symposium; she has done a terrific job. At this time, I would like to
introduce Dean Currier.
DEAN BARRY A. CURRIER:

I am standing in for Jeff Lewis to provide a brief welcome. Last night,
a number of us had the opportunity to watch a wonderful concert at the
Center for the Performing Arts where four musicians, each world-renowned,
came together and played. It was a terrific experience. What you are going
to see today is in a similar vein. Those four people enjoyed getting together
and working on their music; in this symposium, three people from three
different places have come together to interact intellectually. I know they are
going to have fun doing it, and I know that you are going to enjoy listening
and participating.
This symposium is unique. This problem-oriented symposium, to use a
very high-tech and elegant word, is nifty. It is a nifty idea to put together
a problem like this and to march through it. I would like to thank Professors
Blumberg and Prentice for coming all this way to participate. I also would
like to thank Professor Gordon for helping me to understand the importance
of an international program at the law school. This symposium and your
presence is a tribute to his work.
III.

NATIONALITY, VEIL PIERCING, AND SUCCESSOR LIABILITY

PROFESSOR MICHAEL GORDON:

We are able to hold this fourth symposium only because of the support
that we have received from Deans Lewis and Currier over the last four years
and because of the efforts of the Journal staff. I especially would like to
thank Karen Clark for her efforts in putting this program together with me
over the last six months. As the law school has grown in size, it has become
quite difficult to become acquainted with many of the students and faculty
and to learn more about the students than the impressions that one gains in
class. I look forward each year to working with the editors and the
symposium chairperson.
Judge Cardozo's "mists of metaphors," which he believed enshrouded the
relationship between parent and subsidiary corporations when he decided the
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Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway Co. case in 1926,' seems little diminished
as we reach its seventieth anniversary. But our colleague Professor Dan
Prentice, who has come from England, has an older legacy of entity law with
which to deal. We are exactly a century beyond the Salomon5 decision of
the House of Lords in 1896 which contributed to rendering English courts
ineffectual in dealing with the problems presented by corporate groups under
statutes of general application where Parliament has not specifically
addressed the issue.
Lest one believe that a century diminishes the value of precedence, the
House of Lords revisited Salomon in 1989 to affirm that "the decision of this
House in Salomon . ..is as much the law today as it was in 1896. ,6 I
suspect that the considerable criticism of this decision is as appropriate today
as it was a century ago.
In the decades since Salomon and Berkey were decided, the use, the locus
of control, and the regulation of the private corporate form have grown with
a geometric progression that would have amazed Malthus. Some form of
privately owned corporate entity is common in essentially every nation except
a diminishing few that retain nonmarket economies. But as those nations
enter a transitional stage to become market economies, an early enactment of
some form of private corporate or company law verifies that transitional
stage. The locus of control has changed from shareholders to board of
directors to management. Regulation has changed the corporate entity from
a Crown-granted privilege of specific contours, to a highly limited grant of
the legislature, to a more flexible entity enabling those who formed it to do
all that is not specifically prohibited rather than only that which is specifically permitted. During these decades, the corporation has been the principal
entity that has led domestic economic growth and allowed nations to help
others, whether in reconstruction after conflict or in emergence from
underdevelopment.
The characteristics of a corporation - I hesitate to say internal affairs for
fear of being asked for a definition - has been the subject of extensive
domestic control on state, provincial, and federal levels. Successive stages
of legislation have changed the regulatory nature of corporate characteristics
from restrictive to enabling. In this federal system, many of those characteristics have been harmonized by model acts. In the United States and in the
European Union, attempts to federalize corporate law have failed for the most
part. As of yet, no "U.S.A., Inc." form exists to replace state forms, and no
"Societas Europaea" form exists to supplement, if not replace, the various

4. 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
5. [1897] App. Cas. at 22.
6. J.H. Rayner Ltd. v. Department of Trade & Indus., [1990] 2 App. Cas. 418, 506
(1989) (appeal taken from Eng.).
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forms of corporations permitted by the different European Union member
states.
Domestic regulation of the activities of corporations, in contrast to the
regulation of their characteristics, has increased dramatically with the passage
of antitrust, labor, securities, safety, environmental, and other laws. On the
international level, regulation has been considerably more elusive. Formation
of a world trade organization to govern corporations in the late 1940s, when
the World Bank7 and the International Monetary Fund8 were established and
the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) 9 was concluded, failed
due to opposition in the U.S. Senate. The surge of postcolonial nationalism
in the 1960s and 1970s made regulation of multinational corporations a
priority of the developing nations through structured organizations, such as
the United Nations, and less-structured debates such as the North-South
Dialog. Codes of conduct were heatedly debated, rarely adopted, and
essentially never implemented. Today, the U.N. Center for Transnational
Corporations is part of the "Jurassic Park" of the United Nations.
Efforts for self-regulation of the nations of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have been marginally
successful. Clearly, the greatest success seems to be the inclusion of foreign
investment provisions in the new agreement of the World Trade Organization
on trade-related investment measures or trends. But most of these measures
have not addressed the nature of a corporation when it fragments into a
structure that would do justice to Henry the Eighth's family tree. Fragmentation of a corporation within a nation, especially a federation of states, creates
numerous issues for which we have yet to establish clear rules. These issues
include veil piercing, successor liability, and perhaps even more fundamentally, "Whose corporation is this?"
When the fragmented corporate structure crosses national borders, these
issues become far more complex as they collide with differing concepts of
the nature of a corporation. It is to a few of these collisions that we devote
this discussion. The hypothetical and organizational schematic forms the
basis for our discussion of these issues.
Our two guests are Phillip Blumberg, Professor and former Dean of the
University of Connecticut School of Law, and Professor Dan Prentice,
Professor at Pembroke College, Oxford University. Professor Blumberg is

7. The International Bank for Construction and Development, also known as the World
Bank, was established on July 22, 1944 by the United Nations.
8. The International Monetary Fund was established on July 22, 1944 by the United
Nations.
9. GATT was established after World War II to promote the expansion of international
trade on a nondiscriminatory basis. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for
signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
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a graduate both of Harvard College and Harvard Law School and practiced
law in New York City before commencing teaching at Boston University in
1968. He moved to Connecticut in 1974 to serve as Dean of the School of
Law for ten years. He has written extensively, especially the series of books
on the law of corporate groups, our topic today. I have close connections
with Professor Blumberg's school. I was born and raised in Connecticut, and
my most cherished years of education were at the University of Connecticut
Law School to which I returned after several years of practice in order to
teach and become assistant dean. I came to the University of Florida twentyeight years ago just a few years before Professor Blumberg assumed the
deanship at the University of Connecticut. He proved to be an outstanding
caretaker of my old school, in addition to being the only professor in this
country to have the vision that one day we would have to confront the issues
involving corporate groups about which he has written so eloquently and
which we will only partially discuss today.
Professor Prentice, a native of Belfast, Ireland, was educated at Queen's
University in Belfast and then at the University of Chicago. He lived in
Canada before returning to England to begin his teaching career at University
College, which is part of the University of London. He has been a member
of the College of Oxford for more than twenty years. Professor Prentice is
one of the leading authorities in Europe on today's subject.
I welcome you both and appreciate the work of the Journal staff in
arranging for this day. The format will be a discussion. Let us turn to the
subject of our program. Perhaps we should turn to the first of our questions,
which deals with nationalities of corporations. It certainly seems that it is
important to know whose corporation a corporation is. It is important when
we make decisions where to locate and when we speak of what rules are
going to govern corporations. How and why is it important to determine
nationalities of the corporations?
PROFESSOR PRENTICE:

I would like to thank the Journalstaff and the faculty at the University
of Florida for inviting me. I have been to the United States quite often. As
stated, I earned my J.D. at the University of Chicago. My sister lives in New
Jersey. My son works in the United Nations, so I have extensive U.S.
connections. It is quite true that I did come from Belfast; I then married an
Englishwoman, and in those days, marriage relationships were slightly
different. My wife said to me, "Dan, you're the most intelligent one. You
will make the important decisions. Should China be admitted to the United
Nations? Should we have nuclear disarmament? etc. I will make the trivial
decisions: how many children we will have, where we will live, what car we
will have, whether we will privately educate our children, and so on." So,
being English, she brought me back to England, and that is the reason why
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol10/iss2/3
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I did not stay in North America, as I had originally planned.
Regarding the first question: English law is really pretty clear on this.
The nationality of a company is determined by the place of its registration,
by the place of incorporation. There is a division on this within the
European Community. There is a fault line that runs right through this
question, which causes harmonization and company law to be extremely
fraught with difficultly. There are at least three jurisdictions, Ireland,
England, and the Netherlands, that use the place of incorporation to
determine nationality. The other member states determine nationality roughly
along the lines of where the center place of management is carried out. So,
you get a split. This has caused considerable difficulty in introducing
European legislation designed to harmonize the field of company law and
more importantly, the field of financial services, which is probably the most
interesting and significant development within the European Community.
However, an English court would just look at the place of registration; and
the place of registration would determine the nationality of the company.
PROFESSOR GORDON:

Is there any concept that parallels the "pseudo-foreign" idea in this
country? Perhaps the major case is the California decision where although
the parties incorporated in Idaho, they were essentially California shareholders, and the location of the business was in California.1' They did this to
avoid cumulative holdings. This is an area that seems to be becoming more
important as time goes on.
PROFESSOR PRENTICE:

Let me give you an example. This actually is part of the Salomon
legacy. In England, many companies are what is called "shelf-companies."
The large law firms in London will incorporate companies by the hundred.
Then, when they need them, they pick them off the shelf. That is why they
are referred to as shelf-companies. They are used for all sorts of purposes,
Now,
such as holding a patent or transactions at the end of the tax year.
one of things about England, and it is the same in the United States, is that
it makes access to the corporate form extremely simple. There are
incorporation agents who you can telephone to buy a company: £250 is the
going rate. So, you can be incorporated, as it were, in an afternoon. In
some continental countries, particularly the Netherlands, access to the
corporate form is restricted. Most continental countries see the corporate
form as a type of privilege, and they try to impose, sometimes not very
effectively, some limitations, some quality controls in getting your hands on

10. Western Air Lines v. Schutzbank, 258 Cal. App. 2d 218, 66 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1968).
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a company. Now the Dutch solicitors, or Dutch attorneys as you would call
them, are telephoning their English counterparts through agency relationships
and incorporating their companies in England, even though they are going to
carry on their business in the Netherlands.
Many English
We have no doctrine of the pseudo-corporation.
companies actually will be registered in England, but then they will locate
their place of management outside the jurisdiction. The reason for this is tax.
Our tax laws do not focus on the place of registration; they focus on the
place where the central management of the company is being conducted. It
is very common to find in English Articles of Association of Companies
provisions to the effect that all meetings of the directors and shareholders
will be held in Paris or the Channel Islands; provisions to the effect that no
business conducted by the company in the United Kingdom and its
shareholders' or directors' meeting shall be valid. That is to get you outside
the range of the tax laws. It is the place of registration that determines
nationality.
PROFESSOR GORDON:
Even if English law were very restrictive in a particular area, such as
directors' meetings, if a company became chartered in the Netherlands or
somewhere more accommodating, like the Cayman Islands, in order to avoid
being deemed an English company based on the nationality of shareholders
and the place of business, would English courts apply the law from the place
of incorporation as opposed to English law?
PROFESSOR PRENTICE:

You have to be very careful. It depends on why you are applying the
law.
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:
Bravo! That is the whole point of the discussion. It is pointless to talk
about nationality in the air. It is a concept. The law borrows the concept
and applies it in one way for particular purposes and in another way for other
purposes. Professor Prentice gave one example of that. We should try to
avoid referring to nationality without also saying, "Nationality and for what
purpose?"
What of other relationships that do not satisfy the conventional
definitions of nationality but might be analogous to nationality or serve as
links to nationality, and therefore serve very much the same function for
some purposes? This is the approach of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
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Relations Law of the United States, section 213.11
Nationality for corporations is very clear: it is the state of incorporation.
However, there are other factors such as the nationality of the shareholders
controlling the corporation. In certain circumstances, this may serve as a
substitute or supplement for nationality in determining the application of
legal concepts or statutory scope.
For internal structural questions, such as the questions of the law
governing shareholder relations with directors and the application of statutory
requirements for valid corporate action, the system obviously needs one clear
and readily ascertainable source of law. The state of incorporation serves as
a ready answer. However, the minute one is concerned about external issues,
such as the corporation and the government or the corporation and third
parties, this presents serious problems. The issue is too important to be
determined by the decision of corporate counsel whether to incorporate in
Florida, Connecticut, the Netherlands, or England.
One cannot discuss nationality in the air. One must inquire into the
context in which the concept of nationality is being applied. Imposing tort
liability? Determining the applicability of the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations? Determining the applicability of the antiboycott law? Each
situation is a separate legal universe. The concept has a different role in
these various universes.
PROFESSOR GORDON:

I think you are suggesting that there really is not any harmonization, and
perhaps that there cannot be a harmonization of the concept of nationality
because it is so dependent upon function.
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

As I have suggested, one should confine oneself to a discussion of
nationality for a particular purpose in a particular context under a particular
legal system. Throughout the world, large business is operating as part of a
global economy. Everything we will be discussing today reflects the
inadequacy of dealing with problems of world business through systems of
national law. Ultimately, I would hope that there would be a harmonization
of the various legal concepts in different legal systems. International law
attempts to give such a harmonization to some areas, including nationality.
In Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., 12 the International Court of
Justice accepted the conventional rule and concluded that corporate

11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 213 (1987) [hereinafter THIRD RESTATEMENT].
12. Barcelona Traction, (Beig. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 20).
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nationality was determined by the state of incorporation. The Court,
unfortunately, did not make it clear that its pronouncement was directed
toward the particular issue before it. This was the determination of the
nation or nations entitled under international law to represent the interests of
a corporation affected by the actions of another nation, that is, whether it was
the state of incorporation of the corporation or of the state of residence of its
shareholders. Canada was the state of incorporation, whereas the great bulk
of the shareholders were located in Belgium. Canada had dropped out of the
controversy that challenged the acts of Spain affecting the corporation that
conducted its business in Spain. The Court had to decide whether Belgium
could conduct the litigation after Canada had chosen not to continue. There
was no allegation that Canada was opposed to the Belgian action.
The Court answered this question in reliance on the traditional view of
corporate nationality. The Court held the corporation was a Canadian
corporation because it was incorporated there. Canada, accordingly, could
have appeared. The Court concluded that reference to the state of incorporation was the sole criterion of nationality, and that a state, such as Belgium,
relying on the nationality of the shareholders lacked standing to represent
them under international law. It did so even though Canada had elected not
to pursue the litigation itself and apparently had no objection to Belgium
doing so.
PROFESSOR PRENTICE:

I tend, actually, to feel that nationality, at least regarding most of the
problems that I have come across involving crossborder issues, has not been
a major problem. For example, consider a foreign corporation that is
carrying on business in the United Kingdom. Assume its placement
corporation is the Netherlands. Its nationality would obviously be Dutch, but
if it sets up business in the United Kingdom, it must establish a place of
business there. That means there must be some permanent connection with
the United Kingdom, and then we require that company to register under the
1985 Companies Act. 3 We subject the corporation to a number of
provisions in the Companies Act: details of directors, filing of annual
accounts, registration of charges over its assets in our company's register.
So, despite its nationality, we make it subject to certain regulatory rules,
which we impose on all companies that carry on business activities within the
United Kingdom.
The issue of nationality, with many of these regulatory problems, simply
is not a serious one. You can regulate the company even though it may not
have the nationality of the jurisdiction in which it is being regulated. We

13. Companies Act, 1985 (Eng.).
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have overseas companies; there is a whole provision in our Companies Act
that regulates their activities, provided they have established a place of
business. That is the connector. We also wind up foreign companies.
Perhaps you would think that the only jurisdiction that can wind up a
company would be the place of incorporation. After all, it is the jurisdiction
that created it and should be the jurisdiction that can dissolve it. But we
wind up overseas companies even though they have not been incorporated in
our jurisdiction. It is a slightly complex area. We normally do it where the
company has assets in the United Kingdom that could be made available to
the company's creditors. Curiously, it is not essential to have assets but that
is the normal situation.
So again, when it comes to protecting creditors within the U.K.
jurisdiction, we will extend our winding up jurisdiction, and I agree that it
is controversial when it involves companies that were not incorporated in the
United Kingdom. It just depends on what regulatory issue you are facing.
Of course, we could wind up the company, and it could still exist; it could
carry on business in the Netherlands and Belgium. The most famous cases
concerning this type of situation are called the Bank of Moscow cases. 4
The Bank of Moscow was nationalized by the Bolsheviks shortly after 1917.
But in the 1930s, it was discovered to have assets in the United Kingdom,
and we wound it up. We were winding up an entity that no longer existed.
Provided there are assets in the United Kingdom that can be made available
to creditors, the court will assume jurisdiction. So, it really depends on the
issue in front of us. In most situations, you can extend your national laws
to foreign legal entities, if they are within your jurisdiction. And we do it
extensively.
PROFESSOR GORDON:
For the limited purposes for which we try to use nationality, where
Europe and most civil law countries tend to look at the seat of the business,
is that essentially the equivalent of the principle place of business?
PROFESSOR PRENTICE:
That is correct.
PROFESSOR GORDON:

What about corporations, such as Unilever or Royal Dutch Shell, that
extend across borders, having several seats of business and headquarters in
different countries?

14. See Russian & English Bank v. Baring Bros. & Co., [1936] App. Cas. 485; Re Banque
Industrielle du Moscow, [1952] Ch. 919.
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PROFESSOR PRENTICE:

Well, I do not know how civil lawyers answer the problem of whether
you can have more than one seat. For the United Kingdom, it is not a
problem. It is where you are registered. But if you carry on business in the
United Kingdom, the proper phrase being "establish a place of business," and
normally that means some type of permanent commercial connection with the
United Kingdom, it is just a matter of fact. Then we will wind the company
up. But it is a problem for the European Community where there is a split
in legal traditions. If you are a legal entity within the Community, then you
have free movement within the Community and can benefit, as it were, from
the internal market. A lot of the European Union Directives, these are the
European legislation of financial services, require a double connector. They
require registration within a member state of the European Community and
a principle place of business.
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

In response to Professor Gordon's question, I would say that insofar as
U.S. corporations are concerned, there is a rich body of analogous material
on the standards used by the federal courts in determining the "principal
place of business" of a corporation for purposes of establishing diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction. A number of doctrines have been applied. These
include the "nerve center" test, the center-of-operations test, the place-ofactivity or physical assets test, the maximum-public visibility test, and the
totality-of-corporate activity test. These doctrines attempt to resolve the
dilemma of designating the single principal place of business of a giant
enterprise that conducts major activities in a number of states. Thus, the
board of directors may meet in one state, while the office of the chief
executive may be in another. Major plants may be located in still other
states, and so forth.
PROFESSOR GORDON:

Since we have discussed nationality, we should look at both the
protective principle and the territorial principle to determine whether we have
similar or different views. Perhaps, we should discuss the territorial
principle, which currently seems to be very important regarding the Cuban
situation. How is the English government responding or how do you
respond, as a professor who is from outside the United States, to the kind of
extraterritorial principle that the United States has used in governing the
conduct of its corporations abroad.
PROFESSOR PRENTICE:

I should say that this is an area where I do not claim any particular
expertise. I will just look at it as someone who is viewing the United States
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol10/iss2/3

10

OF INTERNATIONAL
FLORIDA JOURNAL
Gordon: Nationality,
Veil Piercing,
and SuccessorLAW
Liability

(Vol. 10

and comparing it with, for example, mainland Europe. One thing that always
strikes me is that there is a morality to U.S. foreign policy that is completely
absent in Europe. We do impose certain restrictions on the foreign trading
activities of our national entities, and there are provisions in our legislation
that require an export license for certain types of commodities, usually in the
field of military hardware and software or that type of thing. But the extent
to which we are willing to conduct our foreign policy through economic and
commercial regulation of our multinational companies is very limited, indeed.
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

Echoing what Professor Prentice has said, in a variety of areas, it is
perfectly clear that not only England but also the rest of the developed world
is very hostile to attempts to implement U.S. law abroad. On some matters,
such as our rules on worldwide discovery, there are fifteen to seventeen
nations that have made it illegal to force citizens or persons subject to their
law to comply with orders of U.S. courts with respect to discovery. With
respect to other problems, you have similar national legislation, and that is
the heart of the problem. In terms of the interests of England or Canada,
these actions are entirely understandable.
On the other hand, as the United States seeks to achieve effective
enforcement of its laws with respect to discovery proceedings in litigation
and antitrust or the regulation of U.S. exports, it is not acceptable to permit
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies to ignore U.S. laws affecting their
parents where such action would open the door to ready evasion and prevent
implementation of the statutory objectives. Accordingly, if the United States
concludes, for example, that for national security or foreign policy considerations it is in its best interests to impose sanctions against a particular
country, it is equally understandable why the United States would not be
prepared to permit foreign subsidiaries of major U.S. corporations to take
action to the contrary.
Thus, international conflict will almost inevitably arise whenever world
business is involved and the national laws of the various countries involved
reflect differing national objectives. This is a problem that succeeding
generations will have to resolve, that is, the inadequacy of our present
concepts of corporation law and international law to provide a civilized
resolution to the inevitable conflicts that may be expected to arise from the
applicability of systems of national law to world business.
Current systems of corporation law and international law were formulated
years ago when nations were insular, and business was conducted within a
single nation. Nations then naturally thought solely of domestic law as the
decisive legal standard.
This view reflecting solely national concerns is anachronistic today. It
is inadequate for dealing with the current problems of world business. In
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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consequence, nation-states exist today in a global economy in which national
laws bring even closely allied nations into conflict whenever extraterritorial
exercise of one nation's laws is based on important concepts of law and
policy that differ from those of the host countries in which the global
corporations conduct their business.
PROFESSOR GORDON:

In a past symposium, Professor Harold Maier of Vanderbilt University
made an interesting comment about extraterritoriality and its international
legitimacy under jurisdiction to proscribe rules. 5 Where jurisdiction
extends beyond your territory, and there is overlap and concurrent jurisdiction, the tendency is try to balance interests. This idea comes out in the
Third Restatement, 6 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,'7 and
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,'8 but it is not fully accepted
in other jurisdictions. However, Professor Maier thought that the Cuban
Democracy Act, 19 which just had been passed at that time, had been so
detailed in terms of its control of corporations that it made it impossible to
balance interests.2 ° It essentially removed the balancing process from the
courts to diplomatic circles in order to resolve these questions, which in
reality were foreign policy questions. The United States has not come up
with a very good solution because it appears to be micromanaging the
activities of U.S. multinationals abroad whenever they relate to Cuba, Libya,
and so forth to such an extent that the courts' power to effectively deal with
these cross border conflicts may be somewhat emasculated. And that is a sad
situation, if it is indeed true.
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:
I think it is true. In practice, this means that when such a confrontation
arises, these issues are ultimately determined by power. When the United
States tried to enforce an embargo directed against Communist China and
decades later an embargo against the Soviet Union with respect to the
Siberian Pipeline, numerous nations, including England, France, and Canada,
were hostile and resisted the application of the embargoes to U.S.-owned
subsidiary corporations in their countries. Ultimately, the major powers that
opposed these embargoes, such as England and France, prevailed, and U.S.-

15. Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Cuban Democracy Act, 8 FLA.
J. INT'L L. 391, 394-96 (1993).

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 403(3).
549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976).
595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979).
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (1994).
Maier, supra note 15, at 398.
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owned English and French subsidiaries ignored them without penalty. The
embargoes were seen as a failure and eventually abandoned.
However, other nations, such as Canada, were not in as strong a political
and economic position to resist U. S. policy. While Canada continued its
public opposition to the embargoes, it ultimately had to accept the realities.
The acquiescence of Canada to U.S. policy was masked by a much
publicized agreement for consultation between the United States and Canada
in order to avoid injury to Canadian business from the application of the
embargoes. In the end, however, U.S.-owned Canadian firms complied with
the embargoes.
This problem will not go away. Whenever the foreign policies of
countries differ, the exportation of domestic law, however valid from
domestic points of view in preserving the integrity of domestic regulation and
preventing evasion, inevitably brings about this sort of conflict.
PROFESSOR GORDON:

In your three-tiered division of principles, in addition to nationality and
territoriality, you mentioned the protective principle. Is that where you
protect vital interests or national security? Is that truly a part of the
extraterritorial concept? It certainly seems that with the Cuban case we have
gone so far in extraterritorial application that we have had to justify such an
application. When we have attempted to justify extraterritorial application,
the justification tends to fall back on the national security rationale. The new
Helms-Burton Law is specifically based on national security. Is the
protective principle really a separate idea of nationality or is it more of a
justification for the export of domestic law?
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

I would suppose that in this context, it is a recognition of the limitations
of the nationality principle. There is a Dutch decision that is very interesting.
21
In Compagnie Europbenne des Pbtroles, S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B. V,
the Dutch subsidiary of an U.S. parent breached its contract to provide goods
to the plaintiff. The U.S.-owned subsidiary attempted to justify its refusal to
carry out the contract by asserting that its performance had been rendered
illegal by the promulgation of the Siberian Pipeline Embargo by the United
States. The Dutch court refused to accept the subsidiary's defense based on
U.S. law. The court concluded that the subsidiary, though U.S.-owned, had
been incorporated in the Netherlands and accordingly, was a Dutch
corporation. It applied Dutch law and rejected the application of U.S. law.

21. Hague Dist. Ct. No. 82/716, Sept. 17, 1982 (Neth.), translatedin 22 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 66 (1983).
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The court recognized that under Dutch law, a Dutch court would indeed
recognize U.S. law where great public interests were at stake, such as U.S.
national security or the integrity of U.S. currency, under the protective
principle of jurisdiction of international law. In Sensor, however, the court
found that there was no occasion for application of the doctrine. Extraterritoriality rested not on the existence of a major threat to the integrity of the
foreign state but only on an application of foreign policy that did not involve
the essential interests or the security of the country. The court, accordingly,
rejected the defence resting on U.S. law and enforced the contract.
Professor Prentice will tell you that while English law is hostile to
extraterritoriality in general, it is, of course, fully prepared to reject the
conventional concept of nationality and apply English law during wartime
where required for implementation of its trading with the enemy law. In
times of war, great issues are at stake. One would expect every nation in the
world to recognize that under such circumstances, it would be a legitimate
action by a government under international law. Not only the House of
Lords in the Daimler case,22 but the French courts have so held.
PROFESSOR GORDON:

We do not have a very good record, as evidenced by the Sensor case,23
the Fruehauf case, 24 and te
the Vencap25 case, of attempting to exert this
territoriality aboard.
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

I think it depends on the purpose of the record. If the purpose is the
development of a jurisprudence that is respected worldwide, the answer is
unquestionably that the United States has a wretched record. However, in
terms of achieving a high degree of implementation of policies of importance
in U.S. national law, the record is mixed. There were failures in England
and in France, but at least surface success in Canada.
In this case, which doctrine of law prevailed? As a matter of economic
power not of acceptance of legal principles, U.S. law ultimately governed the
conduct of the U.S.-owned Canadian firms. However, the U.S. triumph was
hollow. China purchased the products it wanted from Canadian, English, and
French firms rather than U.S. firms, and the U.S. firms paid the price of U.S.
policy.

22. Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre & Rubber Co., [1916] 2 App. Cas. 207 (appeal taken
from Eng.).
23. Seneor, Hague Dist. Ct. No. 82/716.
24. Socirt6 Fruehaf-France v. Massardy, CA Paris, 14e ch., May 22, 1965, J.C.P. 1965,
II, 14247 (France), translatedin 5 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 476 (1966).
25. liT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
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PROFESSOR GORDON:

Let us move on from the idea of nationality, which you have indicated
is not usually the focal point when simply trying to look at different specific
actions. When addressing specific actions and attempting to identify what
becomes important, much of the legislation focuses on ownership or control.
Although ownership presumably refers to corporate shares, control is an
essential element. What do we mean by control? Do we need to determine
what are we trying to govern before we discuss the definition of control?
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

Well, I think we do. In the United States, for example, we immediately
have to divide the jurisprudence into statutory law and common law. In
many statutes, the Congress has determined the scope of application of the
statute by referring specifically to "control" and by extending the statutory
coverage to all corporations interconnected by "control." I have called these
statutes, statutes of "specific application."
In the simplest statutes of this nature, the Congress has simply stipulated
that a percentage of the shares of stock or voting stock, for example, fifty
percent, represents "control" and thereby, defined the outer boundaries for the
application of the statute. This simple approach in most contexts is not
effective because it may readily be evaded by manipulation of the corporate
structure.
More sophisticated statutes speak of control in different terms. While
these statutes, or the regulations thereunder, frequently contain one definition
of "control" that rests on a percentage of stock ownership, the percentage
tends to be much smaller than fifty percent. In the great holding company
statutes, for example, the percentages range from five percent to twenty-five
percent of stock ownership.26 The statutes not only contain such a standard
but also employ a functional test that looks to the realities not to the forms
of the relationship between the corporation and particular shareholders. Thus,
under the securities laws, which like most statutes provide for flexible
administrative interpretation, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
generally defines "control" as the power to control the direction of the
management and policies of a company.27 In the actual administration of
the various securities laws and related statutes, the SEC has expanded its
functional standard in certain contexts to include situations where a person
or group has a veto power over certain dealings or even situations where a
person or a group has to be consulted before certain decisions are made.
26. Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841(a)(2)(A) (1996); Public
Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA), 15 U.S.C. § 79b(7) (1994); Savings and Loan
Holding Company Act (SLHCA), 12 U.S.C. § 1467(a)(2) (1994).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1997) (SEC Rule 405) (Securities Act of 1933).
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Accordingly, we should not talk about control in the air, but should
consider control in light of the particular purpose of the statute under
consideration. Thus, to determine whether the seller of securities is a
member of the "control group," the SEC defines "control" as the power of
a holder to get the company to join in the registration statement. This is
different from the application of "control" to determine whether a shareholder
is a "controlling person" for purposes of liability for a company's violation
of the statute. There are many other examples arising under the statutes of
specific application, where the legislature or the administrative agency has
defined "control" in functional terms.
Let us move to control at the other end of the jurisprudential spectrum,
that is, judicial decisionmaking. In common law, in controversies between
private parties, control normally enters through the form of equity jurisprudence that has come to dominate our thinking in corporation law and that we
term "piercing the veil." This is best understood as an application of equity
jurisdiction.
Courts typically will not depart from the established principles of
company law sanctified in cases such as the Salomon decision, namely that
each corporation is a separate juridical legal unit, separate and distinct from
any other legal units such as its shareholders. Courts will do so only when
empowered by traditional equity principles. Under the formulation of
principles, such as "piercing the veil" or "alter ego," it is necessary to show
both the excessive exercise of control destroying the operational independence of the subsidiary (or controlled) corporation and the fraudulent or
inequitable use of the subsidiary (or controlled) corporation to the injury of
the plaintiff.
For piercing the veil, control is frequently described as the exercise of the
parent's (or controlling shareholder's) power so to dominate the controlled
corporation that the corporation has no independent existence. In a
celebrated purple passage from the Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
decision, which is often quoted by U.S. common law courts, the subsidiary
(or controlled) corporation was said to have been so dominated that it had
"no separate mind, will or existence of its own."28 Such a definition of
control for purposes of common law is very different from the standards of
control utilized in the statutes of specific application previously discussed.

28. 247 A.D. 144, 157, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 76 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E. 2d 56
(1936); see Edwards Co. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., 713 F.2d 139, 142 (5th Cir. 1983). It is

easier to "pierce the veil" for problems of jurisdiction and certain other procedural purposes
than to do so for substantive purposes. It is easier in tort than in contracts or property and
so forth.
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PROFESSOR PRENTICE:

I do not want to go into the technicalities of English law, but we tend to
refer to these control concepts as cutoff points. There are points where you
cut off, and if that is satisfied, then you have control for the purpose of that
provision. For example, we restrict loans to directors, and we restrict a wide
range of transactions between directors and companies that you do not in
North America. But, of course, a transaction may be entered into not with
the director, but with the company in which that director has an interest.
And then we simply have a cut-off point to determine if the director controls
that company. We just say arbitrarily that at thirty percent he is deemed to
have control, and the loan is made to him. It is crude but it works
reasonably well.
By far the most interesting concept of control was introduced in 1986.
I think it is one of the most important developments, at least in English
company law, in this century. As you all know from your company law
courses, limited liability provides the members of a company with a perverse
incentive, particularly the directors if they are members. Once a company
is insolvent, that is, there are no assets available for distribution to the
members, it is in the interest of the members to continue to trade, because if
the company is successful they gain. If the company is unsuccessful, if in
other words it goes further into the hole, then in actual fact, it is the creditors
of the company who will bear the burden. So, once you reach the point of
insolvency, limited liability introduces a perverse incentive to continue
trading.
In 1986, in order to try and deal with this problem, we introduced the
concept of wrongful trading with section 214 of the Insolvency Act.29
Broadly, it provides that if the directors of a company continue to trade under
circumstances where they realize the company will go into insolvent
liquidation, then the court can enforce an order on the directors to make an
independent contribution to the company's assets company.3" That is a very
simplified explanation.
In 1980, a regulatory device was introduced to deal with persons who
control companies but who are not elected directors. It is the concept of a
"shadow director." A shadow director is someone in accordance with whose
instructions the board of the company normally acts. This can give rise to
a number of difficulties. For example, a company is in financial difficulty,
and the bank decides to strictly monitor its loan, so it says it wants weekly
reports or even daily reports on the health of the company. The company
directors remain in constant contact with the bank. The bank controls very

29. Insolvency Act, 1986, § 214 (Eng.).
30. Id. at § 214(1)-(2).
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carefully the overdraft facility. Is the bank a shadow director?
Actually not. What you have to do is ask yourself why are you putting
the definition in, why is the legislature formulating it? And it will change
for each purpose, and there is nothing the matter with that. Sometimes, you
simply will have bright-line tests, for example, thirty percent. They are
crude, you know can get around them, but they may provide a satisfactory
legislative solution to what is a complex problem.
PROFESSOR GORDON:

Yet, when we try to devise a statute to govern a specific purpose, we
seem to be incapable of making a definition of control. You mentioned
thirty percent control as being a crude stab at doing this. Would it be better
to leave the issue of control in the hands of the court? I am not sure that any
state has attempted to statutorily define control for purposes of piercing the
corporate veil.
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

That is very true. By contrast, we have defined it to a fare-thee-well in
the statutes of specific application, such as those dealing with economic
activities. There, we have done it very extensively.
I would like to echo what Professor Prentice has said. All of these
concepts have to be applied in the particular context for which they were
devised. The general concept otherwise becomes incoherent. We have no
counterpart for the doctrine of wrongful trading, which is a fascinating
development in English law and has been followed by some of the
Commonwealth countries. We have, however, the comparable development
of lender liability in the very area to which Professor Prentice has adverted.
This is evident not only for purposes of common law and bankruptcy but
also for statutes such as CERCLA that deal with environmental matters.
PROFESSOR GORDON:

Mexico attempted to legislate the definition of control when they passed
their 1973 Investment Law. They indicated that the maximum foreign equity
allowed in a corporation was forty-nine percent. There was another provision
at the end of that statement that the foreign management and control of the
corporation could not be greater than the foreign equity. The assumption was
that as long as the number of directors from abroad did not comprise more
than forty-nine percent, the company would carry out the functions of the
corporation according to Mexican development goals.
After having done a series of joint-venture studies on foreign corporations that do business in Mexico, I went to Mexico. In meetings with a
series of ministers, they said, "We do not know what has happened, because
we have this law that we drafted so carefully to govern the corporations from
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol10/iss2/3

18

FLORIDA JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Gordon: Nationality,
Veil Piercing,
and Successor
Liability

[Vol. 10

abroad, and yet, we are not developing any faster, and we still have
corporations that are functioning the same way as before." I said that if they
looked at the nature of the control, that is, who is on the board, it would
reveal a great deal. In the case of Pemberly-Clark Co., which held fortyseven percent equity in its subsidiary, it had only three U.S. directors on a
board of directors comprised of about fifteen. They had appointed fortyseven percent of the directors and could have appointed more Americans, but
they did not. Instead, they appointed Mexicans. This was the same pattern
with many other U.S. corporations. They would have only two or three
people on the board of directors. It seems clear that when you look at who
the people on the board were, the Vice-President of the International Division
of Pemberly-Clark and the Vice-President for Latin America, that they were
not going to travel to Mexico every month or two to be out-voted by the
other twelve or thirteen directors. So, in terms of the area of control, the
control certainly appears to rest with specific individuals. You need to
analyze who they are, and what is the nature of their positions on the board.
In the same way, it is quite possible to have, as we know through the proxy
system, a very small percentage of shares and yet still have absolute control
over a corporation.
PROFESSOR PRENTICE:

I will give you another example. In the United Kingdom, there is a
statutory requirement to publish consolidated accounts, so you have to get a
definition of what constitutes a subsidiary. In many situations, parent
companies do not want to consolidate the subsidiary's accounts into their
balance sheet, consequently, a practice has developed known as "off-balance
sheet financing," that is, sometimes trying to use a vehicle that you control
but not within the terms of the legislation.
We require the controller to be a member, that is, to own shares. One
test of control is the composition of the board. But we always require
"members" to have a connector. Many people would say that this is just a
technical requirement and could be jettisoned. We have a department store
called Marks and Spencers. Sometimes in allocating contracts, it allocates
them to a single supplier, and it takes up all that supplier's productive
capacity. It controls minutely the production process. Then the question
arises: Would that company be controlled for consolidated balance purposes?
And that is why the member requirement was put in.
It may have been wrong to put it in, but there was a policy reason behind
having the membership connector. There are other companies in the United
Kingdom that also conduct their business in that way. They have a single
supplier, they take all the productive capacity of that supplier, and then they
control the quality. It may be argued that even Marks and Spencers should
have consolidated its suppliers into its accounts. Control just changes
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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according to the purpose for which you need your definition. We will
always need some type of statutory definition. Statutory definitions can
provide a certain benchmark, so that once you know you have satisfied
certain conditions, you have to do certain things. Consolidated accounts are
a good example of when you simply need to bring the controlled entity
within the consolidation. We need a degree of certainty as to what is and
what is not in the consolidated accounts.
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

In response to Professor Gordon's question about the definition of control
and the importance of clarity, I would like to point to two very different
examples from U.S. law. In the Securities Acts, the Congress made "control"
the governing standard for certain purposes of the statutes, but deliberately
chose not to define it lest it provide a blueprint for evasion. As previously
discussed, definition and application of the term was left to the SEC through
its rulemaking powers and its adjudicatory powers, and it has done so
vigorously and expansively.
In consequence, the jurisprudence of corporate groups under the
Securities Act,3' the Securities and Exchange Act,32 the Public Utility
Holding Company Act, 33 and the Investment Company Act, 34 represent one
of the great bodies of U.S. law widely applying enterprise principles through
reliance on the concept of "control." It also provides considerable insight
into the problems of shared control.
That is one model of control. We have another model. It is a Pennsylvania affirmative action statute that is designed to encourage female and
minority enterprises. 35 The legislation goes into great detail with respect to
the degree of control required to qualify for benefits under the Act. It
requires that in addition to a majority of stock ownership, the chief executive
person and numerous other executives in the firm must be female or minority
persons, and they must themselves operate the business, not merely serve as
figureheads. The detail in the law seeks to make it impossible for banks or
other enterprises to qualify for the statutory benefits unless they are in fact
owned and operated by women or minority persons.
These are two contrasting models. One statutory model is a vacuum
without any definition. The other model is filled with excruciating detail.
Yet, however different in form, they represent serious attempts to achieve the
same objective: effective implementation of the statutory policies.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1994).
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1994).
PUHCA, 15 U.S.C. § 79(b) (1994).
ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1994).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 41072 (Purdon Supp. 1993).
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PROFESSOR GORDON:

What is the English perspective?
PROFESSOR PRENTICE:
We have had some splendid scandals in England over the last decade or

so, for example, Re Polly Peck Internationalplc (in administration)6 and
Maxwell.3 7 Really splendid frauds. But my own limited experience in
practice, I am a barrister not a solicitor, is that within the English financial
and commercial community, there is a very strong concept of legality.
People want to comply with the law and will take advice to ensure that they
do. We draft our statutes very precisely. One French professor said we draft
our statutes in England as if we do not trust our judges. Actually, we have
a very good bench, particularly in the area of company law with very strong
judges indeed, who will have spent twenty-five to thirty years as barristers
just doing company law work. Our statutes are precise because we assume,
rightly or wrongly, that this brings about a certain standard of legality and
certainty. But the down side, or should I say the corollary to that is,. if your
transaction does not fall within the strict reading of the statute, which is our
approach, or alternatively, if you go to your lawyers and they can keep you
outside the strict, literal interpretation of the statute, that is one of the
consequences of legality. You are not behaving improperly. In fact, you are
behaving properly. You are trying to structure your transaction so that you
can keep it outside of the reach of the statute and therefore, behave in a way
that is seen as being perfectly legal. I can see all of our arguments against
that: a purposeful construction of statutes is arguably preferable.38 But the
approach in England is this a rather narrow, technical concept of legality,
which I think is complied with. On the whole, when you give advice to
companies and financial institutions, even though they may not like it, they
will comply with that advice.
But the converse, of course, is if they can get outside the reach of the
statute that is a perfectly proper thing to do. And there is a game that goes
on between the legislature and the professional community. They will
introduce one concept of control, the professional lawyers will get round it,
and five years later, it will be tied up. It seesaws back and forth.
Our companies legislation is like your tax code. In fact, your tax code

36. [1996] 2 All E.R. 433 (Ch. 1995).
37. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Department of Trade & Indus., [1974] 2 W.L.R. 338, [1974] 2
All E.R. 122 (C.A.); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972); see ANDREAs F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 68-77,

97 (1993).
38. There is some evidence that this is now occurring.
Powderill, [1990] Ch. 744 (Eng.).
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reads much better than our companies legislation.
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

The relationship between clients and the law and their lawyers presents
serious questions. All Americans are familiar with the stereotype of the
imperious person in enterprise who is supposed to say, "I want a lawyer who
will tell me what I can do, not a lawyer who will tell me what I can't do."
However, the legitimacy of the legal system rests on a high degree of
independence of the profession and upon the readiness of lawyers to risk the
loss of an important client by telling the client not simply what the law is,
but what the wise and sensible course in response to the law should be. This
is quite another problem; one that deserves serious consideration in every
U.S. law school.
PROFESSOR PRENTICE:

It is the solicitor who has the client and wants to permanently keep that
client. The barrister is instructed periodically by the solicitor. When
solicitors are having difficulties getting their clients to comply, they will
often say, "We will take counsel's opinion." The client will come along, and
then counsel will say, "Well, you can't do this." This lets the solicitor off
the hook because the solicitor still has the client, and the client realizes that
it is not the solicitor who is giving this unattractive advice, but the barrister.
Although I think there are many criticisms of the split profession in the
United Kingdom, I think this ability to inject into it an independent element
that lets the other professional off the hook is really a very important
strength. There is a high level of legality in the United Kingdom.
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

It is said that no matter what the rules of law, you can redistribute the
relationships to deal with them. That also is true of taking advice. Is the
client genuinely seeking advice or simply looking for a lawyer who will
express the opinion that the client desires?
PROFESSOR GORDON:

Next, we will consider specific topics, such as piercing the veil and
successor liability. In discussing the nature of control, the nature of a
corporation, the seat of the corporation, the principle place of business, its
nationality, and so forth, we should focus on these specific areas, whether we
are talking about extending boycott laws abroad or corrupt acts abroad.
Have international organizations, such as OECD, the United Nations, and
the European Union, been considering this? Are we too content with the
status of the nature of control? Or would it be better to leave it, for the most
part, in a vacuum and let the courts figure it out, depending on the purpose?
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol10/iss2/3
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PROFESSOR PRENTICE:

It is a very complicated question. It involves the distribution of
responsibility between the legislature and the courts, which really depends
upon the national system within which one operates. In the United States,
you have a federal system; you do not have one-party rule as we do, and you
do not have the type of powerful executives that we have. Our legislation
is not a matter of compromise. The legislation that is driven through is the
legislation that the Secretary of State wants. Normally, he does not
compromise with any other political group within the legislature. The
technique of legislation will be driven by his civil servants. So, within the
United Kingdom, we can get a technical package that is not suffused with
political compromise and normally is of a high technical order. That
allocates a particular role to the legislature and a particular role to the judge.
However, in a system where the legislation is full of compromise and is
extremely diffuse, judges are going to play a much different role in
interpreting it. Let me give you one example. There is a European Union
directive on regulation of prospectuses, that is, public offerings of securities.
You would think that one of the most critical factors in that piece of
legislation would be the definition of an "offer to the public." But in the
preamble to the directive, they come clean, stating that they have not defined
"offer to the public" because they could not get agreement among the
member states as to what that actually meant. It was left up to each member
state to introduce their own definition, or alternatively use "offer to the
public" and leave it up to the judges to define it. Legislation can be a
process of political compromise when you cannot get agreement. You settle
for second best. If that is the structure, the courts will play a particular role.
If it is not the structure, then the courts will play a different role. For
example, in the United Kingdom, because of the extent to which we have the
majority party in control, which dominates the executive, and because we
have a fairly high level of good technical civil servants, we get a particular
product. And our judges then will play a particular role.
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

There is another approach, not of solution, but of accommodation. For
the first time starting in 1994, the U.S. Congress has taken very productive
steps in the direction of international harmonization. It has done so in the
securities and antitrust laws. It has directed the U.S. agencies in charge of
the administration of those statutes to establish links with the comparative
agencies abroad to encourage the development of international coordination,
cooperation, and enforcement of such laws in the participating countries.
Within the last few years, the United States has entered into such
understandings with the European Union and a number of European
countries. For example, if the United States has an antitrust matter with
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

23

1995]

CORPORATE
CROSS BORDER
Florida Journal
of International
Law,CONFLICTS
Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 3

consequences in Europe, the U.S. antitrust people are enjoined to visit with
the European antitrust people to elicit their cooperation and to resolve any
areas of conflict. In a very forward looking step, these agreements also have
introduced an entirely new doctrine called "positive comity." In the past,
comity has meant that before the courts of one jurisdiction would exert their
jurisdiction in a matter with international dimensions, they should take into
account the national interest of the other country involved and evaluate the
relative importance of the opposing interests of the two countries affected.
Where foreign interests are more seriously affected, domestic courts under the
doctrine should abstain from exercising their jurisdiction. Positive comity
goes beyond this. It asserts that before the antitrust or securities agencies of
one country attempt to exercise their power extraterritorially in the country
of the other signatory, they should turn to their counterparts abroad to see to
what extent the necessary action can be achieved by cooperative efforts from
the comparable foreign agency.
Now this is splendid. It may be expected to work well, but only in those
areas where the foreign policy objectives of the different countries involved
are congruent, if not synonymous. Almost all nations oppose restrictive trade
practices. Similarly, all nations reject securities fraud. It is therefore feasible
for nation-states to join forces to deal with "evils" that all perceive as evil.
However, in other areas where the policies of nations are very different,
attempts at harmonization are not going to work.
So, a common international policy on a problem must precede accommodation of this nature. "That's the rub." How many years or decades will it
be before the very different policies of different nation-states on major issues
will be harmonized into a common policy for the world? In the meantime,
we must try to accommodate the inevitable conflicts. We have taken the first
steps, but they represent only limited progress.
PROFESSOR GORDON:

Next, we will turn to more specific issues, such as veil piercing. In
reviewing all of the corporation cases in Florida, the largest number of cases
in a substantive law area involving questions other than long-arm jurisdiction,
which itself comprises a large number of cases in Florida, are those that deal
with veil piercing. There are probably six or eight cases each year in the
Florida District Court of Appeals or the Florida Supreme Court that address
issues of veil piercing. This seems to be true in other states as well.
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

Perhaps, 750 cases per year nationwide.
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PROFESSOR GORDON:
You are all probably familiar with Zaist v. Olson,39 which is not a
particularly good case coming out of the Connecticut court.
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

Let me digress in order to make a point that has serious jurisprudential
implications. Professor Prentice stated that the bench in the United Kingdom
is composed, in significant part, of former barristers who have extensive
company law experience. That is not generally true of U.S. state appellate
justices, except perhaps in Delaware and to a limited degree, in some of the
federal courts. We are dealing with judges who are guided in significant
measure by the concepts learned decades ago when they were in law school.
In consequence, we are getting the continued application of conventional
corporate law. However well-suited those doctrines may have been for the
problems of the relatively simple corporations of yesterday, they are
anachronistic for application to the modern global multinational enterprises
that dominate the world economy today.
PROFESSOR GORDON:

Most of the consulting work I do that is not international deals with
domestic veil piercing. In the last three or four years, I have represented five
of the Fortune 500 companies in fairly large cases, such as the Cafish
litigation,40 which was just settled with Hormel. I go into depositions
representing the defendant, wondering and sort of hoping, (I do not tell my
clients this), if someone is going to ask, "What about enterprise liability,
Professor Gordon?" No judge or opposing attorney has ever raised that
question. We are behind in our development of this. Why do you suppose
this is so? More decisions than just the Salomon decision show that it is a
concept that came out of the late nineteenth century.
PROFESSOR PRENTICE:

There is a very famous Irish joke, where someone is in the middle of
Ireland, and an English traveller stops an Irishman and says, "How do I get
to Dublin?" And the bloke thinks for a while and then says, "Well, if I
wanted to get to Dublin, I wouldn't start from here." We started at the
wrong end of the telescope. We developed Salomon at a time when we
simply did not have corporate groups.

39. 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967).
40. In re Catfish Antitrust Litig., 908 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Miss. 1995).
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PROFESSOR GORDON:

Would you briefly explain the Salomon' case?
PROFESSOR PRENTICE:

Mr. Salomon ran a boot-shoe business. He sold the business to Salomon
and Company, Ltd. It paid Mr. Salomon 21,000 shares and also a debenture,
which was secured. Also, six shares went to Mr. Salomon's family, one to
each of five his children and one to his wife. The business went into
liquidation. It could have gone into liquidation because feet had gone out of
fashion but that is probably not the explanation. The explanation is that Mr.
Salomon was one of the first examples of a situation in England where
semiorganized labor, rather than striking against the industry, decided to
strike against a single employer. This was not common in England; normally
when a strike takes place, it is against the total industry, whereas your auto
workers, if I understand correctly, pick out one employer, stage a strike
against that employer, and that sets the benchmark for wages in the industry.
Now, what does that tell us about Mr. Salomon? Well, the trade unions
in England can be on occasion be foolish, but they are going to strike against
the most unpopular employer in the industry. The company goes into
liquidation. As you know, liquidation is a collective scheme for distributing
assets. The assets are distributed according to the pre-insolvency entitlement
of the creditors. At the top of the queue, we have the debenture-holder with
the charge. Of course, it is a characteristic of insolvency that the creditors
are paid off according to their seniority. They are paid off in full, and there
is no compulsory sharing. Although Mr. Salomon had assigned this
debenture, the assignee takes no better rights than the assignor. So, at the
top of the queue of distribution in actual fact was Mr. Salomon.
Then came the unsecured creditors for whom there was no money. And
since the company was insolvent, there was nothing available for the
shareholders. The real reason the liquidator brought the action was because
Salomon seemed to be able to finance the company in such a way that the
risk of failure, given limited liability, was moved to the unsecured creditors;
he could exit his position.
Salomon is really a case of a missed opportunity. We should not have
gone down the route of veil piercing. We should have developed a
subordination doctrine to the effect that if a person setting up a company
injects both debt and equity into the company, we will treat that debt as
equity, so that the unsecured creditors are protected. The court said that the
company was separate and distinct from Mr. Salomon. Therefore, Mr.

41. Salomon v. Salomon & Co., Ltd., [1897] App. Cas. 22 (P.C. 1896) (appeal taken from
Eng.).
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Salomon could have the payment against the company. This is the essence
of the corporate entity doctrine that has become an entrenched aspect of
English company law.
The enterprise argument has actually been put to the court. What you
have is a simple situation. You have the principal debtor, the principal
creditor, and the guarantor of the debtor's debt. It was a contract between
guarantor and principal creditor. The creditor will have the right of
indemnity against the principal debtor. So there are two possible claims.
There is the creditor's claim against the debtor for the debt. There is the
guarantor's claim against the debtor because the guarantor will have the right
of indemnity. Out of this single transaction, there are two potential claims
against the debtor. You have the claim of the creditor to be paid, and you
have the continued claim of the guarantor, because if the guarantor has to
pay up, then the guarantor is entitled to an indemnity. If it is the principal
debtor who goes into liquidation, there is the possibility of two claims. The
creditor will lodge proof for the loan; the guarantor has a contingent claim
and also may want to lodge proof. All insolvency laws have developed some
type of doctrine of double proof. There can be only one claim with respect
to the single debt. In liquidation in the United Kingdom, normally the
principal creditor will claim against the principal debtor, but then the
guarantor cannot lodge any proof. It is called the principle of double proof.
You can have only one claim with respect to the single debt.
There is a company called Polly Peck International (PPI). It used to own
the Jolly Green Giant brand of foods; it was a conglomerate. In 1990, it
went into what is known as administration but for all intents and purposes,
we will treat it as liquidation. 42 Polly Peck International, an Englishregistered company, sets up a Cayman finance vehicle, which is called Polly
Peck Finance (PPIF).43 Polly Peck Finance borrows over £450 million from
various banks, and PPI guarantees it with eight bond issues.' The parent
sets up the wholly owned subsidiary, the subsidiary borrows £450 million,
and the parent guarantees the debt. Polly Peck is now in liquidation. The
banks want to claim on their guarantee saying, "We want to lodge proof."
Polly Peck Finance wants to claim the £450 million that had been loaned to
the parent as just a financing vehicle, but the argument is that this is double
proof. These are exactly the same claims.
The judge, Justice Robert Walker, rejected the argument of double
proof.45 One argument put forward was that in actual fact, these companies

42.
43.
44.
45.

Re Polly Peck Int'l plc, [1996] 2 All E.R. 433, 433 (Ch. 1995).
Id.
Id. at 436.
Id. at 441-42.
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were a single economic entity.46 The argument was put forth by counsel,
a Mr. Kosmin Q.C. and a Mr. Chivers. They said that PPI and PPIF were
a single economic entity.
(i) [Polly Peck Finance] was incorporated solely for the purpose of
the bond issues; (ii) it had no separate, independent management;
(iii) it had a very small paid-up capital; (iv) it did not pay the costs
of the transactions and could not have done so; (v) it had no normal
bank account and no separate financial records ... ; (vi) the terms
of the on-loan [the PPIF on-loan to PPI] were not independently
negotiated ... [and in fact, they] were never finally agreed ... ;
[and] (vi) no lender could or would have relied on PPIF's covenant.47
What they really wanted was the guarantee from the parent, which was an
asset-wealthy company. In the course of his judgment, Justice Walker stated
that the principle of Salomon was the principle recognized by the English
courts.4 8 He held that PPI and PPIF were separate entities. 9 He found
that PPIF was not the agent of the parent, and the Court was not willing to
pierce the corporate veil.50 The argument was not enterprise liability, but
the language they used was "single economic unit." But the conceptual
apparatus was exactly that idea. Although Justice Walker said that he found
Mr. Kosmin's submissions most persuasive on this part of the case, he was
not ultimately persuaded by them."
That is the way English courts approach group problems. Notice what
is happening. Kosmin argued that the reason for treating this as a single
economic entity was that the principle of double proof is the basis of
insolvency law. 2 Therefore, they wanted it to be treated as a single
economic entity in circumstances where it will uphold or bolster up an
existing public policy. They did do not want the judge to create new public
policy, but to defend existing public policy, which has been in cases since the
middle of the nineteenth century. It was an attractive argument. Counsel
was not asking the judge to do very much. In fact, they were asking the
judge to take a small step. Knowing the way the English courts work,
Kosmin could have formulated a principle that we will, in certain circumstances, treat a group as a single economic entity where that furthers an

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 447.
Id. at 445.
Id. at 444-45.
Id. at 445-46.
Id. at 447.
Id.
Id. at 448.
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existing public policy. However, again, Justice Robert Walker refused to go
down that road. This illustrates how ironclad the regime is.
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

Well, I believe that there is a ready explanation for this phenomenon,
which you have heard described in splendid detail. This is the essence not
only of the Salomon decision but of traditional corporation law in this
country as well. Where did this jurisprudence, so unrealistic in today's
global business economy, come from? Most legal historians conclude that
English concepts of the corporation are derived from the perceptions of
medieval scholars of Roman corporation law. They thought that under
Roman law, quoting Roman commentators such as Ulpian, each juridical
entity had its separate, legal existence and its own rights and duties entirely
separate from any other entity; that the rights of the corporation and the
duties of the corporation were separate and distinct from the rights and duties
of the shareholders. This concept of the corporate legal personality became
firmly fixed in English law centuries before acceptance of limited liability
and the decision in the Salomon case decades later. Corporation law
formulated in this manner is U.S. law as well as English law. It also is the
law in the other developed countries of the Western world, including Russia.
The separate judicial personality of the corporation is the common inheritance
of nation-states in the Westem world from the Romans.
These principles of corporate law originally were developed with respect
to municipal corporations, such as towns and boroughs, and to the bishops
of the church with respect to church property (the so-called corporation sole).
They did not arise in connection with business corporations. In fact, there
were no business corporations during the centuries in which English law took
shape. It was not until centuries later that the first business corporations
emerged in the form of great trading companies, of which the East India
Company is the best example. Indeed, in the aftermath of the South Seas
Bubble and the Bubble Act,53 there were only six corporations formed in all
of England during the eighteenth century.
Similarly, in the United States, there were only six corporations in 1776.
Of these, only one was a manufacturing corporation and that soon became
insolvent. Thus, the formulation of our corporation law has roots that have
very little to do with economic activity. It was borrowed lock, stock, and
barrel from the law distinguishing between a town and its residents. Nevertheless, the doctrines accepted in this manner served quite well in resolving
the legal problems of the small economic enterprises of the time, consisting

53. The Bubble Act, 6 Geo. I, ch. 18 (1719) (for preventing of joint stock corporations
with transferable shares). It was ineffective and repealed in 1825. Id.
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of a corporation and its individual shareholders.
Corporation law emerged before there were corporate groups. Until late
in the nineteenth century, a corporation was barred from owning shares of
another corporation unless the legislature expressly gave it the power to do
so, a power that was almost never given to a manufacturing company.
Accordingly, when the law spoke of the corporation being separate from the
shareholders, it was essentially saying that the business enterprise was
separate from its individual investors, investors who supplied capital but were
not themselves carrying on the business.
In the United States, this framework did not change until the 1890s when
New Jersey changed it corporation law to authorize all corporations to own
shares in other corporations. 4 Lincoln Steffens, one of the muckraking
journalists of the time, characterize this development in a well-known article,
"New Jersey: A Traitor States."" This came at a time when trusts, the
prevailing form for business concentration, were being outlawed under the
great trust-busting movement of the 1880s and the 1890s. The net result was
that the great corporations of this country speedily flocked to reincorporate
in New Jersey. In response, the other states followed suit and adopted
statutes modelled after New Jersey's.
Business structure in the United States underwent an immediate change,
a change described as a turning point in U.S. business history. Major
businesses changed from individual corporations conducting their own
businesses to much larger corporations with enormous accumulations of
capital and which issued shares of the holding company or parent corporation
in exchange for shares of the formerly independent manufacturing companies.
A major change in the form of U.S. business occurred with the restructuring
of the major U.S. corporation into corporate groups with an increasing
number of subsidiaries.
Corporation law, which was formulated before these corporate groups
came into existence, soon proved inadequate to deal with the problems they
presented. When faced with issues involving the legal interrelationship of the
parent and subsidiary corporations, courts in the United States and in England
responded essentially in a syllogistic manner. Major premise: Shareholders,
being juridically separate from the corporation, are not liable for the
corporation's obligations. Minor premise: A parent corporation is a
shareholder of a subsidiary corporation. Ergo, a parent corporation has no
liability for its subsidiaries' obligations.

54. Act of Apr. 4, 1888, ch. 269, § 1, 1888 N.J. Laws 385-86; Act of Apr. 17, 188, ch.
295, §1, 1888 N.J. Laws 445-46; Act of May 9, 1889, ch. 265, § 4, 1889 N.J. Laws 412, 414;
Act of Mar. 14, 1893, ch. 171, § 2, 1893 N.J. Laws 301.
55. Lincoln Steffens, New Jersey: A Traitor-State, Part II - How She Sold Out the
United States, 25 MCCLURE'S MAG. 41 (1905).
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Applying the traditional doctrine of separate corporate personality to
corporate groups ignores the reality that the economic relationship between
parent and subsidiary is very different from the economic relationship
between the corporate business and its investor shareholders. The parent and
the subsidiary collectively are the business; they collectively conduct the
business under the control of the parent. Unlike the parent shareholder of the
subsidiary, the investor shareholders of the parent corporation are not part of
the business.
A concept of separate juridical existence of corporations based on the
distinction between the business enterprise on the one hand and its investors
on the other required reexamination when it would separate one component
of the business, that is, the parent corporation, from another component, that
is, the subsidiary. Instead, the doctrines that were developed with respect to
the very different earlier type of corporation were automatically applied to
the newer corporate groups without any reexamination whatsoever.
The older law, which served the older business world consisting of twolevel structures (shareholder-corporation), became applicable to the modem
business world consisting of three-level structures (shareholder-parent
corporation-subsidiary corporation), where it does not fit at all. Its
application continues because our judges and law professors typically do not
recognize this revolutionary change. They continue to analyze issues by
reference to the doctrines developed with respect to the older, outmoded
world of the small business, as applied in the Salomon case, with traditional
piercing the veil with all its restrictions as the only safety valve.
Where corporate groups are involved, piercing the veil is not a useful
approach in its traditional form because it turns on factors that completely
ignore the economic realities of the situation at issue. It turns on such
matters as compliance with corporate forms and the indicia of independent
operation; standards that become ineffective when corporate affairs are
conducted under the supervision of counsel. Through meticulous observance
of forms, legal consequences can readily be avoided by formal procedures
without independent economic significance. Further, piercing the veil is an
exercise of equitable jurisprudence. For equitable intervention, fraud or
inequitable conduct as well must be shown. With a governing doctrine
turning on compliance with formalities and a showing of fraud or inequity,
economic realities are ignored and the implementation of the underlying
policies of the law in the area at issue can be readily frustrated.
Enterprise liability, where appropriate, has an entirely different
foundation. It rests on the proposition that all parts of an integrated business
ought to be responsible for the obligations of the business when it serves the
underlying principles of the law in that area. There are limitations. First, it
is not a transcendental doctrine. It should be applied selectively only where
useful in implementing basic legal policy. For example, in contract law
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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where fulfillment of the expectations of the parties is a major objective, its
application to transactions involving a bargain over credit is rarely appropriate. However, in tort, particularly in product liability matters, it serves tort
law very well, as has been recognized by almost all U.S. jurisdictions.
Second, problems in formulation and application arise when a wholly
integrated business is not involved. For example, it runs into difficulty when
conglomerate enterprises are concerned. What then is the business of the
conglomerate group? As in Professor Gordon's example, what is the
business of a company that operates both mines and hotels? Mining or hotels
or both or neither? Should the hotel part of the business be liable for the
mining? This raises a new and very serious problem. Further, where you
have partly owned subsidiaries, what is the appropriate treatment of the
minority interests? These, however, are subsets of the larger problem.
However, you cannot think clearly about subsets until you have satisfactorily
analyzed the more common problem of the single-integrated business with
sole control. At this point, one should struggle with the further issue of
scope of application. Finally, we must remind ourselves that the root of the
problem is the concept of the separate juridical identity of the corporation,
which dates back to the jurisprudence of the Romans.
PROFESSOR GORDON:

I gathered that Justice Robert Walker did not distinguish in Polly Peck
between the fact that the Salomon case was an individual and therefore
belongs in that other group dealing with an individual shareholder with a
claim against a corporation. I certainly agree that this was really a time for
subordination theory to develop when the shareholder was attempting to have
some priority. We would have to deal with it separately under some kind of
veil piercing when we are talking about a shareholder who is not making a
claim but is against a claim being made for the credits of the company.
In this large body of cases, 750 a year in the veil piercing area, they
rarely discuss enterprise liability. For the reasons raised by Professor
Blumberg, it is not taught very much in law schools. It is not being
presented to the courts as something to consider. That is one of the factors
retarding in its acceptance in the United States. One possible avenue of
acceptance might be through judgment enforcing or through negotiation, such
as the Badger controversy,5 6 where there was the issue of severance pay and

56. This was a celebrated controversy between a bankrupt Raytheon third-tier subsidiary
named Badger and the Belgian Government in behalf of Badger workers deprived of severance
pay. See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS IN THE
BANKRUPTCY OR REORGANIZATION OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS INCLUDING

THE LAW OF CORPORATE GUARANTIES, § 17.09.2 (1985).
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creditor's claims, or in the Deltec5 7 case, which involved economic unit
theory, the unidad econ6mica theory. Is there any greater hope that a U.S.
court would accept it? Would a U.S. court address an attempt to enforce a
judgment that was based on a very clearly outlined judgment based on
enterprise theory? Would a court in England accept that?
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

I will be glad to respond, but if I hope I may digress for a moment and
comment on subordination in the Salomon case. One of the great subordination cases in the United States is Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co.,
better known as the Deep Rock case. 8 This involved the treatment of the
bankruptcy claim of a parent corporation against a subsidiary that the parent
had mismanaged to its own advantage. In the Court of Appeals, counsel
relied on the theory of piercing the veil in arguing that a reorganization plan
treating the intercompany claim as a valid claim was defective. Relying on
the traditional concepts previously discussed, the court rejected this
contention.
In the Supreme Court, Justice Roberts, who probably would have had
serious difficulty in getting the Court to reverse the decree below on the issue
of piercing the veil, sidestepped the issue entirely. Affirmed in its decision
handed down months later in Pepper v. Litton, 9 the Court established a new
framework for decision. The validity of the parent's claim was no longer at
issue. Instead, the issue was formulated as a question of bankruptcy law to
be determined by principles of fairness. The issue was restated as a
determination of the proper order of payment of the inside and outside
creditors when the insider parent corporation had treated the subsidiary
unfairly. Because of the parent corporation's unfair conduct, its claim, while
not disallowed, was subordinated. The parent had to wait at the end of the
line of creditors. The outside creditors were to be paid first instead of being
diluted by being forced to share with the parent corporation. The net effect
was just as effective as if the Court had pierced the veil and disallowed the
claim. The Court achieved an enterprise outcome not by challenging piercing
the veil jurisprudence, but by making its application irrelevant.
This was a question of lawyering. Professor Gordon asked the question
how far would you get if you argued enterprise liability to the judges? If I
were counsel, the answer would be that such an approach presents many

57. Deltec, [1973-19] J.A. 579, 151 Revista Juridica Argentina-La Ley 516 (1973); see
Michael W. Gordon, Argentine Jurisprudence:Deltec Update, 11 LAW. AM. 43, 43 (1979);
Michael W. Gordon, Argentine Jurisprudence: The Parke Davis and Deltec Cases, 6 LAW.
AM. 320, 329 n. 10 (1974) [hereinafter Gordon, Parke Davis and Deltec].
58. 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
59. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
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difficulties in today's world except where statutory policies or fundamental
tort law objectives are involved. Except in certain areas of procedure,
bankruptcy, and statutory law, this approach has had limited success.
In my volumes, I have collected these cases in which enterprise law has
been at issue. It is plain that the results are very mixed. Enterprise doctrines
are unquestionably percolating through the courts. They have had considerable success in a number of areas, and a newer jurisprudence of corporate
groups may fairly be said to be emerging. At the same time, it is essential
to recognize that the success depends on the area of law in question. Where
controversies between private parties at common law are involved, it is very
difficult to consider the application of principles so long as the courts
examine the issue with the frozen mindset of the traditional corporation law.
Justice Douglas was able to escape the rigid framework that separate
entity imposes on the Western legal world by relying on the doctrine of
equitable subordination in bankruptcy. Other U.S. courts are utilizing other
legal frameworks to solve the dilemma. Of these, expansion of tort concepts
and agency concepts are the most prominent examples of judicial approaches
through which the courts have imposed enterprise liability without using the
term. In a series of cases in Delaware, in areas of franchising law, and in
areas of health care law in many jurisdictions, expanded concepts of agency
or quasi-agency have served as the rationale for application of enterprise
principles.
The jurisprudential transformation of tort product liability law is one
example. The expansion of such concepts as apparent authority and apparent
agency in agency law and nondelegable duty in tort law beyond their
traditional common law limits provides other prominent examples. New
wine has been poured into old bottles; enterprise results have been achieved
without use of the term.
Some of this goes back to the felicitous but unhelpful opinion of Justice
(then judge) Cardozo in the Berkey case,6' which is taught in most U.S. law
schools or at least used to be. It is an unfortunately decided case, resting on
a less than correct statement of the facts. However, the language of Justice
Cardozo's opinion captures the imagination, such as his celebrated observation that while metaphors provide insight into problems, they may ultimately
enslave one. For purposes of the present discussion, it is useful to note that
in addition, Justice Cardozo recognized that agency law provided an
alternative to piercing the veil for imposing liability on a dominant
corporation.
Now, in contexts where public issues of magnitude are at stake, the U.S.
Supreme Court in a series of important decisions has ignored the traditional

60. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
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jurisprudence of the separate juridical identity of parent and subsidiary
corporations and the applicability of piercing the veil jurisprudence. One
example is FirstNational City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de
Cuba,6 also called the Cuban Trade Bank case. Justice O'Connor allowed
a U.S. bank to set off its claim against the Cuban government for confiscation against the bank's liability to a Cuban government instrumentality that
admittedly had a juridical existence separate from that of the government.
Justice O'Connor made it clear that large public issues were at stake. In
order to implement the underlying objectives of U.S. law at issue, she
disregarded the separate corporate existence of the Cuban governmental bank,
expressly rejecting reliance on the "worn epithets" of piercing the veil to
decide the case.62 Public policy, not corporate forms, determined the
outcome.
Another major decision is Anderson v. Abbott.63 This involved the
provision of the National Bank Act, that imposed double assessment liability
on shareholders of national banks when required for payment of bank debts,
including depositors' claims. In this case, the depositors in a failed bank
owned by an insolvent holding company sought to impose double assessment
shareholder liability not against the insolvent holding company, which owned
the shares of the bank, but against holding company shareholders, who had
several years before traded their shares in the bank for shares in the holding
company. In a five-to-four decision, the Court said that it would not be
bound by traditional notions of corporation law where the imposition of
double assessment on the holding company shareholders (although they were
not shareholders of the bank itself) was required to implement the federal
policies of double assessment liability. Otherwise, a statutory policy to
protect bank depositors would be frustrated by corporate restructuring and the
interposition of the holding company between a bank and its public
shareholders.
Yet another example of the Court's application of enterprise principles
is the series of decisions referred to as the Unitary Tax decisions.' These
decisions hold that a state may determine its corporate taxes on an in-state
member company of a multinational corporation according to apportionment

61. 462 U.S. 611 (1983).

62. Id. at 623. Justice O'Connor warned "against permitting worn epithets [such as
piercing the veil jurisprudence] to substitute for rigorous analysis." Id. (citing Berkey, 244
N.Y. at 84).
63. 321 U.S. 349 (1944).
64. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, reh 'g denied, 464
U.S. 909 (1983); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 352 (1982);
ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin

Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S.
425 (1980).
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of the consolidated income of the group to the in-state affiliate, typically
according to the fraction that the sales, payroll, and assets within the state
bear to the group or enterprise as a whole. In five or six cases presenting
this issue, the Supreme Court has consistently applied an enterprise view and
has developed a standard for determining the constitutionality of state
corporate tax, resting on the concept of "the unitary business."
In summary, it is important to note that in each of these cases, a
profound governmental policy underlies the readiness of the Supreme Court
to depart from the concept of separate juridical existence and apply enterprise
principles in the implementation of legislative policy. By contrast, in
common law controversies between private parties, the prospects of U.S.
courts at this stage, through the gradual evolution of the common law
shaking loose from the bonds of the separate entity concepts symbolized by
Salomon, which are widely accepted in the United States for common law
purposes as well as in England, are less promising except in very special
areas.
PROFESSOR GORDON:

Your comment about public policy issues in the Cuban Trade Bank case
invokes the English-Poland Rolimpex case,65 dealing with the Polish sugar
issue, because the Cuban Trade Bank case was able to get away from the
strict veil piercing theory. Rolimpex, a Polish sugar company, which sold
sugar through a state enterprise, had contracted to sell sugar to an English
company, but was later ordered by the Polish government not to sell the
sugar due to a national shortage. There was a question as to whether there
was adequate separateness between the company and the government. The
mentality that came out of the Salomon case kept the English court in the
Rolimpex case from being as adventuresome as Justice O'Connor was in the
U.S. case, even though this was a public issue because it dealt, to some
degree, with preserving a resource within the country in a time of shortage.
Do the English courts respond differently on public issues?
PROFESSOR PRENTICE:

Well, there might be some public issues that could affect the court's
approach. When it gets to areas central to public policy for society, then the
courts may be willing to try to enforce the policy and override Salomon. We
have no written constitution in the United Kingdom and therefore, no
provision that protects property. Therefore, it is possible for our criminal
legislation to empower the government to impound and expropriate property

65. Czarnikow Ltd. v. Centrala Handlu Zagranicznego Rolimpex, [1979] App. Cas. 351,
[1978] 2 All E.R. 1043 [hereinafter Rolimpex].
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that they suspect is the proceeds of criminal activities. They can then place
the onus on the property owner to prove that the property is not derived from
a tainted source. One of these powers is under our legislation enforcing
customs and excise; it is a tax on alcohol in this case. The court can appoint
a receiver, and the receiver can then appropriate the property, making a
confiscation order against the alleged delinquents in order to confiscate the
property. In one case, involving massive fraud, a group of companies had
66
been set up and were avoiding tax at the rate of a million pounds a week.
The government made an expropriation order against the property of the
companies. The companies said that they were not committing an unlawful
act, rather it was the directors and the shareholders who were defrauding the
government. At the end of the judgment, the judges stated that they were all
the same people, and it was a single orchestrated fraud; the court upheld the
granting of the confiscation order.67
In cases of critical dimension like Re H, a court might override Salomon,
but those cases are very rare. In 1990, there was a famous case, Adams v.
Cape.68 It is a very complex case because it was an attempt to serve an
order made in Texas, which was a default judgment against an English
company or a series of English companies in Texas with respect to liability
to asbestosis claims. It involved quite complex problems of conflicts of laws.
Lying behind the scheme was that in 1974, the English company had carried
on its distribution activities in the United States through a wholly owned
Illinois subsidiary. It was then that the claims of asbestosis began to
develop. So, it was agreed that the motive of the company was to minimize
their future liability with respect to these claims. They liquidated their
Illinois subsidiary and another company, which was run by the managing
director of their English subsidiary, started distributing in Illinois. Now, you
can serve the judgment so that it can be enforced in England, if you show
that the English company was present in the United States actually
distributing the asbestos. It would depend on whether the court can pierce
the corporate veil and say that this company in the United States was in
actual fact the English company. There were number of points, but the
Adams court refused to do so.
But we do have a doctrine for fraud, but it is very tightly defined. Fraud
means depriving a person of an existing proprietary interest. I agree to sell
you my property but before the conveyance to you, I set up a company and
convey the property to the company. I then argue I do not own the property,
therefore, you cannot get specific performance. The courts have said that is

66. Re H, [1996] 2 All E.R. 391 (Eng.).

67. Id.
68. Adams v. Cape Indus. plc., [1991] 1 All E.R. 929, [1990] 1 Ch. 433, 544 (C.A. 1988)
(Eng.).
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a fraudulent scheme. But how does this play out for a victim? To show
how entrenched Salomon is, the argument was put forward thus: This whole
arrangement of liquidating their Illinois company was designed to minimize
liability. One of the judges, a strong judge, Lord Justice Slade, said that we
do not accept as a matter of law that the court is entitled to lift the corporate
veil as against the defendant company that is the member of a corporate
group, merely because the corporate structure has been used to ensure that
the legal liability, if any, in respect of particular future activities of the group,
and correspondingly, the risks of enforcement of that liability, will fall on
another member of the group rather than the defendant company.
So you can organize your affairs in such a way that the risk of the
activity will be isolated within a component of the enterprise. That is a
legitimate use of the corporate form in the United Kingdom. We are light
years away from any form of enterprise theory.
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

What is the extent to which courts have been able to get away from the
rigors of corporate separation by using other theories? I would to ask
Professor Prentice to comment on Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre & Rubber
Co.69 This case was decided at the height of World War I. It involved the
applicability of the English Trading with the Enemy Act to a company
incorporated in England but which had German directors and shareholders
and a secretary who was German by birth although a naturalized English
citizen. It is especially interesting how the various judges on the House of
Lords divided on this issue. While some concluded that English incorporation made the company English as had the lower court, the Court ultimately
held the statute applicable. It did not challenge the separate corporate
existence of the company or its English incorporation, but instead turned to
end-run theories such as the German residence of the directors and the lack
of corporate authority for the company's secretary to institute the lawsuit.
It is evident how great public policy concerns dominate consideration where
an issue such as trading with the enemy arises, particularly during wartime.
By contrast, tort and contract cases involve controversies among private
individuals.
PROFESSOR PRENTICE:

Daimler has been cul-de-sac'ed by Adams. 70 The courts have simply
said that in turns on the language of the Trading with the Enemy Act, in
defining whether this is the enemy you can look at who composes the board.

69. [1916] 2 App. Cas. 207 (appeal taken from Eng.).
70. [1991] 1 All E.R. at 929.
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PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

There is a great public policy concern in the Trading with the Enemy
problems. Tort cases, however, involve a controversy among private people.
PROFESSOR PRENTICE:

There is a case Lee v. Lee 's Air Farming Ltd.,71 an appeal to the Privy
Council from New Zealand, that involved a one-man company. Director Lee
ran it. Lee was killed while carrying out the company's activities. It was
crop-dusting. His wife then brought an action against the Social Security
authorities, saying that because Lee had a contract of service, she was
entitled to certain compensation. The added question was: Was there a
contract of service? How could Mr. Lee, as director of the company, enter
into a contract with Mr. Lee, the employee? The Court, stating that they did
not understand what the difficulty was, held that the company was separate
from Mr. Lee. Mr. Lee, as managing director, could enter into transactions
for the company with Mr. Lee, the potential employee.
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

There are many U.S. cases that have considered the same problem that
was raised in Lee, and most have had similar results. However, they have
done so on the theory that it is simply a question of the corporate hat the
person is wearing at the time of the particular action. In Professor Prentice's
example, Lee is wearing Director Lee's hat when he signs the contract, but
when he runs around to the other end of the table, he is deemed as putting
on another hat, Employee Lee's hat, when he signs the contract. In matters
involving statutory enforcement, however, U.S. courts are increasingly
repudiating the "hats" doctrine.72
I would like make another comment about asbestos cases, such as Adams.
Although we are talking about the law, the presumably objective law, courts
are not immune from the passions and emotions surrounding the claims of
victims in massive tort catastrophes for compensation. If you look at the
great massive tort cases of our time, in the end, the plaintiffs have frequently
prevailed against the parent companies. They have prevailed in cases like the
Union of India v. Union Carbide Corp. (Bhopal) case,73 which is held out

71. [1961] App. Cas. 12; [1961] N.Z.L.R. 325 (P.C. 1960).
72. See United States v. Sealey, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 353 (1967) (antitrust); Resolution
Trust Co. v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534 (10th Cir. 1993). But see United States v. Jon-T Chems.,
Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985) (False Claims Act).
73. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984, 634 F.
Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied sub nom. Executive Comm. Members v. Union of India, 484 U.S. 871 (1987). For
complaint, see Government of India v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 86 Civ. 2696 (S.D.N.Y.
1985). For Indian decisions, see (1989) 1 S.C.C. 674, (1989) 2 S.C.C. 540, (1989) 3 S.C.C.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

39

1995]

Florida Journal
of International
Law,CONFLICTS
Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 3
CORPORATE
CROSS BORDER

as a great example of enterprise liability. However, if you read the pleadings
in the Bhopal case, you will see that the lawyers, sharing the analysis that
Professor Prentice and I have advanced, had but one cause of action resting
on enterprise liability and five causes of action resting on the direct liability
of Union Carbide for its own negligence. If you turn to another great case
of this nature, the Amoco Cadiz74 case, you will find exactly the same thing.
The complaint contains one count relying on enterprise liability and endless
counts alleging direct liability.
The Bhopal case never went to judgment in the United States on the
merits.
But the plaintiffs ultimately prevailed in India, receiving a
US$470,000,000 settlement. In the United States, Amoco Cadiz went to
judgment, and the plaintiffs prevailed. The judge upheld the concept of
enterprise liability, but only after also upholding many counts of direct
liability. On appeal, the defendants never challenged the finding on
enterprise liability. Thus, while Amoco Cadiz is a square holding in favor of
enterprise liability, it is an alternative holding. Accordingly, it is of limited
use to the advocate.
It is very useful from an advocacy point of view to include a count of
enterprise liability in situations of this sort to demonstrate the folly of
applying traditional law where it is contrary to the economic realities.
However, it also is essential to provide alternative grounds, based on
accepted legal doctrine, on which liability can be supported. Enterprise
liability has served as a useful advocacy tool while counsel really hopes to
prevail on a more traditional theory.
We are beginning to see the same thing in the In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implants Products Liability Litigation7 5 consolidated in Alabama, involving
thousands of claimants. Thus, Judge Pointer already has held that Dow
Chemical, a fifty percent shareholder, is not liable as the parent for the torts
of its subsidiary, while setting down for hearing the other question of
whether Dow is liable for its own negligence by reason of its own acts in
connection with the design and research of the product.
The problem that arises for corporate counsel is that in the integrated
group, it is very hard for the parent to police its participation in the business
activities of a group to the extent that lawyers might prefer and that would
be quite costly in terms of the development and marketing of the products.
Management needs to use the group talent wherever it can be found. It is
very useful to have group research and development, for example, available

38 (India).
74. In re Amoco Cadiz Oil Spill, 1984 A.M.C. 2123 (N.D. Il1. 1984), aff'd 954 F.2d 1279
(7th Cir. 1992).
75. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 837 F. Supp. 1123, 1126-27
(N.D. Ala. 1993), confirmed 887 F. Supp. 1455 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
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for all of the subsidiaries. In the end, the corporation has a trail of direct
involvement. Therefore, enterprise liability as a legal theory is still very
useful. But it has to be harnessed with something else in order to be
effective in many cases.
To return briefly to piercing the veil, there has been somewhat greater
success by counsel who have been successful in persuading courts to apply,
even in common law controversies with private individuals, somewhat
watered-down notions of piercing the veil. In a few jurisdictions, counsel has
been successful in persuading courts considering tort cases that the tort itself
will constitute the unfairness required for application of the traditional
doctrine. In statutory matters, courts are even more ready to conclude that
the statutory violation will satisfy that element of piercing the veil.
In some other jurisdictions, on proof of an excessive utilization of
control, it may be possible to achieve success on an alternative theory of the
sham corporation, which the court will disregard. It is interesting to note
from the example provided by Professor Prentice that this would not be
successful in England.
PROFESSOR GORDON:

You have partly answered the question raised previously on whether
there are other theories to supplement or replace piercing the veil piercing.
In the Caofish76 case, which is in the advance stages of litigation, we
thought we were fully prepared to show that directors of parent company
serving on the board of the subsidiary and a consolidated balance sheet are
typical of other corporations; consequently, the situation in our case was no
different than how all other U.S. corporations work. That was how we
planned to defend. In looking at all the information, we discovered a
directive that came from one of the senior officers of the home company,
who was neither a board member nor a manager of the subsidiary, that went
directly to the issue of price fixing in Alabama and Mississippi. I thought
that this was a direct liability issue, which was why we settled for over
US$10 million.
In civil law countries in Europe and in some Latin America countries, the
enterprise theory is more palatable than the veil piercing theory. If the
German court were to render a decision clearly on the enterprise theory that
involved a parent in England, would the Brussels Conventions require that
they uphold it?
PROFESSOR PRENTICE:

I think that the English courts would have to enforce the judgment. Yes,

76. In re Catfish Antitrust Litig., 908 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Miss. 1995).
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we do pierce the corporate veil. There is no overriding public policy against
the practice. If a German court did hand down a decision holding the
English parent liable on some theory, we would have no option but to
enforce. You do get a certain forum hoping to try to drag the parents in.
Most civil law jurisdictions are much more flexible about holding parent
companies liable for their subsidiary's activities. For example, the big oil
companies in the United Kingdom, Shell and perhaps BP, incorporate each
one of their bulk tankers as separate companies. The reason is that if a bulk
tanker goes aground and destroys the mussel beds of Northern Europe, which
occasionally happens, only the tanker and its cargo are liable. I find it a little
odd myself that an English court would recognize the separate legal entity of
a bulk tanker. If you read our judgments, the courts realize that parents
control subsidiaries. On the other hand, the French courts would not. There
is a French decision where they settled, but it was settled because the lawyers
said, "You have not a hope in hell."
One other example shows how Salomon pervades our culture. It is the
legal culture of the separate legal entity. In the 1970s, the House of Lords,
in a decision from which they have since departed, held that a builder of a
house, basically, could be liable not only to the original purchaser but also
to future purchasers, down the line. In other words, they created a tort
liability. If you built a defective house and were negligent, then you could
be liable not just to the purchaser in contract but to third parties who
purchase from the purchaser. There is one construction company that built
luxury homes. It became quite concerned about its potential liability down
the line. So, what was seriously discussed, but did not come through, was
to have the parent company vest house one, house two, and house three in
separate companies. When a house is built, you sell the house and pass the
cash upstream to the parent, who then collapses the subsidiary. So when the
house develops a feature that was not in the advertising brochure, that is, a
three-foot gap in the bedroom wall, who do you sue? The builder is not
there and the vendor has gone into liquidation. Note that in this case, there
was no existing liability. It is not like Jones v. Lipman.7 Instead you go
back to Adams. It is permissible to organize corporate structures in such a
way that you can isolate the risk to the group within a separate entity. That
is all you are doing; you are saying that in this world of risk, risk can be put
in different compartments. And if this risk happens to come home, it will
not contaminate the rest of the group. In Adams, you could have an
argument that this is perfectly proper.

77. [1962] 1 All E.R. 442, [1962] 1 W.L.R. 832 (Eng.).
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PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

I would like to respond to Professor Gordon's question as to the extent
to which one country will enforce judgments of another in this area. In the
United States, there is only one decision that is on this point. The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit upheld and enforced an Israeli judgment resting
on piercing the veil.7" The court emphasized the English roots of the Israeli
doctrine and the similarity of the Israeli doctrine to U.S. law. It then
inquired into the standard principles for enforcement of judgments: Was
there notice? Was there an opportunity to be heard? Was there jurisdiction?
Did the case involve an action that deeply affected concepts of U.S. public
policy?
In analyzing this case, the court tried very hard to demonstrate that
Israel's law is very much like our own. The Israeli law on piercing or lifting
the veil, which was derived from English law, does not differ very much
from U.S. law. Accordingly, it was difficult to contend that the Israeli action
was deeply offensive to U.S. concepts of public policy. Thus, this decision
is of limited help. It does not present the issue of whether a foreign
judgment imposing liability against a foreign parent (or controlling
shareholder) on an enterprise liability theory would be enforced. It tells us
little as to whether a judgment, such as the Argentine action involved in the
Deltec79 case, would be enforced.
Deltec involved the imposition of enterprise liability against the foreign
parent conglomerate, its foreign affiliates, and Argentine affiliates of a
bankrupt Argentine meat-packing subsidiary by an Argentine court with
jurisdiction only over the Argentine subsidiaries. The Deltec court acted
under the theory that the group was a "unified socio-economic entity.""
When enforcement in Deltec came before a New York court, the court
abstained from exercising its jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. But, it also condemned the Argentine action in Deltec as not
being in conformity with U.S. law since it might amount to "confiscation." 8'
The dicta of the New York court provides an interesting insight; if that court
had to apply its concept of public policy to the question of whether the
Argentine judgement represented a policy acceptable for our courts, the
chances for enforcement would not be rosy. This is a fascinating and
unresolved problem.
78. Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F. 2d 862 (1st Cir. 1981) (individual controlling shareholder).
79. Compafhia Swift de La Plata, S.A., conv., 15 J.A. 350, 146 La Ley 601 (1972), affid
in part, rev'd in part, 15 J.A. 368, 146 La Ley 612, rev'd (reinstating commerical court's
decree); 19 J.A. 579, 151 La Ley 516 (1973).
80. See Gordon, Parke Davis and Deltec, supra note 57, at 339.
81. Deltec Banking Corp. v. Compania Italo Argentina de Electricidad S.A., 171 N.Y.
L.J. 2, 18, at col. 1, Apr. 3, 1974 (Sup. Ct.), affd mem., 46 A.D.2d 847, 362 N.Y.S. 2d 391
(1st Dep't 1974), 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 741 (1974).
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PROFESSOR GORDON:

Do you suppose the Badger8 2 controversy was settled by the company
paying the severance pay, but not the creditor's claims, because the company
feared a judgment coming out of Belgium with which the courts would have
to wrestle? If they had done an enterprise liability judgment at that time, the
U.S. courts would not have enforced it.
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

The Badger controversy was a minor fly-speck as far as the enormous
Raytheon group, of which it was a small part, was concerned. Raytheon was
becoming notorious throughout Europe by resisting workers' claims for a
million and a quarter dollars. Any counsel with any sense would say, "For
"Pete's sake, settle! Win or lose, you are better off than having this issue
resounding in the press, particularly since you are being opposed, not by
private parties, but by the Belgian government and by the European trade
union movements." It should be no surprise in view of the scale of Raytheon
operations elsewhere in Europe that it ultimately decided to settle.
If one were to be consulted by a large U.S. company on how it could
structure itself in order to avoid having this sort of liability, one might
readily respond, "Oh, you can do it. There is little question about that.
Structuring the business into compartments kept so completely walled off
from the other parts of the business, as to prevent any serious possibility of
imposition of enterprise or piercing or direct liability, can be accomplished.
However, it is not likely to be something that you cart afford. Our advice is
to forget about it. If the business engenders liabilities, these are simply
foreseeable costs of conducting the business, which will, no doubt, be taken
into account in your price policies and passed along to your customers."
PROFESSOR GORDON:

One question regarding piercing the veil that the courts have not
addressed very well is: What law applies? The law of the parent or the law
of the subsidiary? In 1972, the International Academy of Comparative Law,
in their meeting in Caracas, considered this issue. When looking at all the
U.S. cases as of that date, dealing with either a U.S. parent and a foreign
subsidiary or vice versa, not one case identified the question of whether the
law of the parent or the law of the subsidiary prevailed. I tend to believe
that the law of the company whose veil you are piercing prevails and yet,
that is not consistent. Plaskon Electronic Materials, Inc. v. Allied-Signal,
Inc. 3 clearly states that it is the law of the parent, by referring to the parent

82. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
83. 904 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
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corporation, not after having raised it as a choice, but by simply referring to
it as being the law of the parent.
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

Law schools should require students to take conflict of laws. That is one
of the most important courses in a lawyer's education. Students may learn
torts and contracts on their own, even if they did not study them in the law
school. However, a knowledge of conflict of laws is essential and less likely
to be acquired on one's own. My own experience in reading the U.S.
common law cases on parent and subsidiaries, which have involved this
topic, is entirely consistent with Professor Prentice's observation. Counsel
and courts often ignore the problem. When you find courts who are alert to
the problems, many times you will find reference to it in a footnote where
the wiser judge says something like, "Neither party has argued the question
of which law applies. Therefore, in accordance with our practice, we will
apply the law of the forum."
As for the ultimate problem, conflict of laws in corporate matters, most
courts treat such issues as piercing the veil as involving the internal affairs
of the corporation and to be determined by the law of the state of incorporation of the corporation involved. It is the subsidiary whose veil is being
pierced, and accordingly, it is the law of the state in which the subsidiary
was incorporated that should be applied under corporation law. Although
some courts have failed to recognize this and have applied the law of the
state in which the parent was incorporated, most courts considering the issue
as a corporate issue have applied the law of the state of incorporation of the
subsidiary.
Many other courts, however, have not looked upon the problem as a
corporate problem. In tort matters, they treat the choice of law as involving
a problem in tort. Where the tort occurred in the forum, these courts often
apply the forum's standards on piercing the veil. In the end, however, the
standards of the various states on piercing the veil differ but to such a small
extent that the issue is not as vital as it appears. It seems to be a question
of mindset. Corporate law problem or tort problem or contract problem?
Looking upon choice of law from an advocacy point of view, if it does make
a difference and if you conclude that you are likely to lose under choice of
law as a corporate law matter, you still have tort. Still other courts have
adoped the "most significant contacts" both for tort or contract matters.
More may be expected to do so in the future.
There are two special areas to be considered as well. One is Delaware
law in common law matters. The other relates to the cases involving federal
statutory law. Many cases have arisen in Delaware, and it is of interest that
whether it is a Delaware parent or a Delaware subsidiary, it seems that in the
end, the Delaware courts, one way or the other, will apply Delaware law.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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PROFESSOR GORDON:

Until recently veil piercing law has been state law when there are more
public issues, such as antitrust litigation, particularly violation of federal law.
The more recent cases indicate that a federal court that is involved with a
violation of a federal law, where there is a fairly strong policy such as
antitrust, will make up a new federal common law of veil piercing. Very
often, the court does not refer to the question of what choice of law would
apply, but rather refers only to a variety of federal court cases on veil
piercing from around the country, not from its own particular district. This
is going to be a very interesting development.
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

Federal law on choice of law with respect to piercing the veil or
enterprise treatment for statutory purposes is even more interesting. Of
course, in federal cases arising under diversity jurisdiction, issues of
substance are, since Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,' to be governed by state
law. However, where a federal question is involved, such as the construction
of a federal statute, the Supreme Court doctrine is somewhat amorphous.
Where federal objectives are involved, such as where there is a need for a
uniform federal standard, where state law would frustrate federal objectives,
and where federal law will not disrupt commercial relationships predicated
on state law, federal common law is applied. Otherwise, state law will
govern.
In many any areas, the courts indeed have done just as Professor Gordon
has described. They have developed a federal common law. In some areas,
this has meant giving the statute a "broad" or "expansive" interpretation and
the imposition of enterprise liability to implement federal statutory objectives.
In other areas, they have achieved the same result through a modified version
of piercing the veil, which some courts have stated gives less importance to
corporate formalities in the area of public law than it does under state law.
In such a manner, the federal courts have considerably watered down the
requirements for piercing the veil in federal statutory matters.
One battleground in which this issue is being hotly litigated is the
environmental laws under CERCLA. Most circuit courts have held that
imposition of statutory liability on a parent (or controlling shareholder) as the
"owner" or "operator" of a property with hazardous waste to which the
subsidiary holds title is a matter of federal law. While they seem to agree
that whether the parent is the "owner" will be determined by traditional
piercing the veil, the majority of the circuit courts have held that whether a
parent corporation is liable as an "operator" is to be determined by the

84. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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economic realities concerning the degree of its participation in management
of the subsidiary's environmental operations, not by piercing the veil;85
however, two circuit courts have disagreed. They have held that traditional
piercing the veil is the only remedy. 6 This is a matter that is in vigorous
dispute and to which there will be a final answer only when the Supreme
Court chooses to hear the issue.
PROFESSOR GORDON:

We do not know very much about successor liability on a worldwide
basis; therefore, it may be helpful to know about it as an internal issue before
we address it as a cross border issue.
Is the idea of successor liability becoming more of a problem? How
does England approach successor liability?
PROFESSOR PRENTICE:

I suspect that an English paper on successor liability would be very brief
indeed. Basically, it is not a concept that we have recognized in our
company law jurisprudence. The other curious thing is, it is not even
discussed. I must say from my ignorance, I came across it a number of years
ago. What happened was an English company that mined in Butte, Montana
had issued a prospectus that did not comply with English company law; it
complied with the English Stock Exchange listing rules, but not the 1985
Companies Act. 7 The Americans decided to sue. The only pocket around
was the English law firm that was responsible for putting on the listing rules.
We had to get advice from the United States on the successor liability issue.
It was a concept the barristers had never come across.
It is not something we are familiar with; it is not discussed. I am not
quite sure why there is this absence of interest and a fairly profound absence
of knowledge.
PROFESSOR BLUMBERG:

This is surprising. In the United States, we have many well-developed
notions of successor liability with no less than five well-accepted theories of
successor liability that have been vigorously applied. There are two more
concepts of successor liability that are quite controversial, but nevertheless

85. Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248 (2d Cir. 1996); Lansford-Coaldale Jr. Water Auth.
v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d
24 (Ist Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991).
86. United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 59 F.3d 584, vacated, 67 F.3d 586 (6th Cir.
1995); Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).
87. Simon Eng'g Plc v. Butte Mining Plc, [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 104 (Feb. 27, 1995),
[1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 91 (Oct. 3, 1995).
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have been adopted by a number of important jurisdictions. The expanding
application of successor liability is a lively topic in U.S. law today. It is a
topic that has given rise to much litigation, both at common law and in issues
under the environmental laws such as CERCLA.88

88. See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Continuity of the Enterprise Doctrine: Corporate
Successorship in United States Law, 10 FLA. J. INT'L L. 388 (1996).
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